The Alevis of Turkey: A
Question of Estrangement?
Tina Hamrin Dahl
Prelude
As he was studying how the process of civilization worked at a
micro level, Norbert Elias (1897-1990) suggested that that which
is deemed to be worthy of gossip is directly related to the
norms and convictions specific to a given society, as well as to
the state of its social relation. However, the established
insiders of the society often regard themselves as being more
civilised than recently settled outsiders, regardless of whether
we study an English suburb (as Elias was doing) or the city of
Kahramanmaraş in southern Anatolia.
Thus, insights into the nature and function of rumour can be
very rewarding in the study of a particular divided society.
Almost everywhere there is a deeply rooted perception of
outsiders. General opinions and notions of people who have
recently moved into the society often function as selective
criteria when rumours are spread about these strangers. Events
that do not conform to preconceived opinions are seldom of any
interest, but negative consequences, which are regarded as the
result of immoral actions by the newcomers, correspond to the
established image and constitute a very important substrate for
rumour, which is never an independent phenomenon.
Having conducted a study of outsiders, Elias noted the following
together with his student John Scotson: the negative image of
the new area which made "the villagers" see every confirming
episode as worth passing on, was the opposite of the positive
image that "the villagers" had of themselves. In everyday
language, we tend to perceive gossip as more or less degrading
information about a third person that two or more persons
communicate to each other. Structurally however degrading gossip
is inseparable from praising gossip, which is usually limited to
one's own person or to groups that one identifies with. Elias
regards power from several different perspectives. Power is not
something that one group possesses, while another group lacks it
- rather, it is a question of relationships. The balance of
power is changeable in all configurations, and through this
flexible balance an authoritative relation can gain meaning, but
also lose its credibility. "Human figurations are in a constant
state of flux, in tandem with shifting patterns of the
personality and habits of individuals."
My research in Turkey calls to mind some of the issues raised in
the study mentioned above. Why did the Alevis in the province of
Kahramanmaraş meet such a miserable fate when they moved from
their mountain village to the towns in southern Anatolia in the
1970s? Is it possible to find, in retrospect, the reasons for
the massacres and harrasment to which they were subjected? It is
possible that the consequences are more interesting than the
circumstances which brought them about, in which case we should
explore the violence as part of a phenomenon belonging to the
social, cultural, religious, political and economical elements
of the given social and historical whole. It should be possible
to find explanations by means of history and memory. The
expression of the past, the actual representation that carries
the collective self-image of a group, is that which guides the
group into the future.
The phenomena of "nationalism" and "ethnic affiliation" can be
explored according to prescribed models presented by established
nationalism researchers. Is a nationalist way of thinking
inherent to human nature, as some claim; is nationalism a
modernist phenomenon; or perhaps nations are the creations of
nationalists? Could nationalism possibly be related to a
capitalist need to control; or maybe we should use
ethno-symbolic interpretations in order to explain nationalism
as a phenomenon?
My reflections on classic analyses of nationalism have here
given way to Norbert Elias' ideas about insiders and outsiders.
However, the thoughts of Ernst Gellner are also present in my
mind during the research process, albeit at times implicitly.
The Alevis have come under fire several times; now they are
voicing their plight in a plea for help from the EU
representatives in Brussels: "We exist and want to be
acknowledged as an ethnic or religious group with minority
status within the Turkish Republic!" My choice of subject, a
study of the Alevis in Turkey, is both socio-political and
ethno-religious, cultural and ideological - perchance it is also
an economic analysis?
Set of questions
To a certain extent, Mats Alvesson and Stanley Deetz emphasize a
perspective that I, too, use in my work: "'Politics' does of
course not primarily refer here to parliamentary, or even
explicitly extra-parliamentary politics, or to organisational
politics or other power struggles that are connected with
expressed interests and materialized conflicts (even if these
are also significant), but to the wider institutional and
ideological questions that shape society and social relations".
According to Mats Lindberg (previously Dahlkvist), who has
analysed the state as a problem logically and historically,
researchers within political science and political macro
sociology often write about nation-building using Stein Rokkan
as their model, focusing on the European nation state and nation
building processes. If they do not base their writings on
Rokkan's view on the development of democratic institutions and
arenas, their guide is very often Seymour Martin Lipset's
studies of the socio-cultural and historical-economic conditions
of democracy. In many cases, the subject is the creation and
organization of a political movement/political party.
This "either/or" setup is not tenable, since the issues explored
are attitudes of an ethnocentric, modernist character. The
transitional situation between traditionalism/modernism and
nation/organization is seldom categorized in terms of political
science. The phenomenon that I will focus on is the process of
both ethnic construction and organization, with a religious
reawakening as its symbolic cement and part of a ideology of a
community, but which, at the same time, amounts to a political
organization into a movement. According to Lindberg's experience
within the field, a comparison with the labour movement, the
Free Church movement and the temperance movement would not be
totally irrelevant as pertaining to ethnic homogeneity and
organising in a historical space where the state building is
structured and clear.
In this text, I will present some thoughts both on a proposed
outsiderhood and on an actual outsiderhood (as far as this state
is at all measurable). My subject is a group of people which is
not fully accepted by the Turkish state or by the country's
Sunni Muslim majority. Above all, the issue explored in terms of
the constructions of identity.
From a modernist viewpoint, the process in Turkey can be
regarded as reform nationalism. Studies by primordialists, who
think that nationalism is a timeless phenomenon, and by
perennialists, according to whom nationalism is an old idea
repeatedly emerging in new forms, have not been taken into
account in my study. Researchers on nationalism of course hope
to find the right theory, so as to be able to use scientific
methods and axioms for their analyses of nationalism. Of the two
dominant meta-narrative research theories that promise to
deliver the truth about nationalism, primordialism can be called
contextualism and modernism must be regarded as social
constructionism. However, by using perspectivism we might
perhaps be able to see that the grand narrative descriptions are
limited for those who want to understand what nationalism is.
Researchers who want to study the shaping of "abstract
communities" can, by applying a perspectivist way of thinking,
get away from the meta-narratives on ethnic minorities. They can
move away from social constructions and towards a competing
model of interpretation that is based on various approaches and
perspectives. The interplay in social relations is initiated by
power, which is clearly discernible when studying communities
from several perspectives.
Ontologically speaking, we should avoid so called realities
(that are presented using various theories) and realize that
nationalism is much more complicated and confusing than the
great meta-narratives admit. Maybe the inter-subjective nature
of the nation can be glimpsed through perspectivism? We must
focus on origins and development, exceptions and exclusions,
unforeseen events and potential possibilities in the processes
that shape nations. We must question the way in which a certain
perception of the nation is formulated and the way in which that
perception becomes predominant over other social misconceptions,
in order to perhaps create a special disciplinary form of
knowledge.
By studying the nation through various lenses, researchers see
that this is a constantly shifting concept. Perhaps genealogical
questions should be asked the Sunni Muslim Turkish nationalists
who present certain approaches?
We must explore what theories lie behind the various
perspectives; how they have come to manifest themselves by
asserting certain rules that have an impact on our powers of
imagination and our thoughts about society. In order to be able
to describe nationalism, it is important to know how different
perspectives interact; we must also excavate the power relations
that support and confirm the perspectives.
In other words, in a study of nationalism the researcher must be
aware of the role of power relations and the risk of limiting
one's ontological gaze, since everything appears so clear and
self-evident in the various single models for interpreting
nationalism. Power relations are not only involved in the
construction of disciplinary meta-narratives within elite
circles; they also play a certain part in the theories of nation
building that are evident in social life. Thus, one must
question and problematise nationalism instead of reifying the
phenomenon. What kind of reason is produced by the nation? What
forms for identity and customs are created because of the ways
Sunni Turks think of the nation and have a feeling for some kind
of nationalism?
People are always dependent on other people; therefore people
exist in figurations, that is, many mutually dependent people
together form groups. Norbert Elias uses the ballroom dance as a
metaphor for this, since we do not see dance as a formation
outside individuals, neither as a pure abstraction. The same
dance figuration can, of course, be danced by several different
individuals; but without several individuals, dependent on each
other, who dance with each other, there is no dance. Time and
time again in history, Sunni Muslims have tried to obliterate
the Alevis; but both groups are somehow mutually dependent, even
if they have never succeeded in dancing together.
Methodologically, I explore texts that try to express an image
of the Alevis, that proclaim their existence. What does the
image look like? Are they outsiders? This essay is about
identity, about "us" and "them"; that is, the social
construction of "the Other".
Mustafa Kemal led the Turkish secularization process and
demonstrated what norms were to be applicable. Nevertheless,
Islam as the basic convention has never been eliminated; customs
and manners have been shaped within the Muslim tradition. The
Hanafi legal school of Sunni Islam has articulated the norms
that are the standard of behaviour in Turkey. The Kurdish
Shafi'i form of Sunni Islam is, at least nominally speaking,
different, and the religion of the Alevis, which is the subject
here, differs considerably from that of the majority. Kurds and
Alevis are commonly regarded as being uncivilized by prejudiced
Sunni Turks, explains Nedim Dagdeviren, Head of the Kurdish
Library in Stockholm.
Using Elias' ideas on the relations between the established and
the outsiders as my point of departure, I will explore the
situation between Sunni Muslims and Alevis in the Kahramanmaraş
region. Further, I will study the chain of events concerning the
massacre that took place in December 1978 and reflect over
theories of moral panic. The image of "us" and "them", the
created history, the self-image of the Alevis - as it is
presented both by Alevis and external researchers - are in
focus.
According to Elias, the social is much more than "a by-product
of agreements and contracts between freely acting individuals".
His concept of figuration accentuates a unity between an
individual and society which enables us to understand collective
behaviour during, for example, moral panic. The rationalisation
of processes must not be oversimplified - the individual and
society must not be constructed as two separate worlds. "In the
figuration model people are part of long and complex chains of
dependence and interaction, chains of inter-dependence between
people. Here, people are connected and related to each other,
and between them there are power relations… The figuration model
is also valid for relations between social groupings".
The spontaneous emotional impulses of individuals must be
controlled if individuals are to be able to interact in modern
society. "This important element of civilization Elias leaves
partly to the self-control of individual actors, partly to
social institutions… Power is, according to Elias, mainly
expressed in the practical ability of dominant actors to turn
various kinds of resource into means of maintaining or
developing their own dominance."
Elias' concept of "double-bind figuration" is interesting in
this context, since the 1978 massacre in Kahramanmaraş can be
seen as a social situation with a spiral movement of panic and
aggression between social groups. "Such conflicts lock those
externally representing the groups in a destructive conflict and
result in the institution of stereotypes with a 'hatred picture
of the other side' which stands in contrast to an idealized
picture of one's own side."
The aim of this essay is to try and illuminate a nationalisation
process, focusing on a social group which is being harassed. By
exploring the Alevi self-image and the image that is ascribed to
this minority by the majority in Turkey, I will study an example
of a civilization process in micro format - an example of
Norbert Elias' theory of the established and the outsiders.
Is the process of stigmatizing the Alevis possibly linked to the
nationalisation process? My objective includes, as Elias
suggests, searching for ongoing processes that move over long
historical periods. Above all, I wonder whether the oppression
is as explicit as the Alevi historical narrative wants to claim,
and whether various media had cemented notions of "us" and
"them".
By studying the literature and mass media, and combining this
with interviews, I will place Alevis and Sunnis against each
other in the polar pairs of majority and minority, insiders and
outsiders - however, always suspecting that dichotomies are
illusory.
A survey of research on outsiderhood shows that studies of
deviation initially were totally functionalist (when it comes to
modern sociology). But when Howard S. Becker published Outsiders
in 1963 and Erving Goffman Stigma in the same year, the authors
underlined that other people's reactions contributed to the
feeling (in those who were singled put) of being different. In
the 1960s a number of books on deviance appeared. A disparate
collection of theories on deviance was called labelling theory.
"Although these studies were often classified together as
belonging to the labelling or societal reaction perspective,
this designation was a very wide blanket term, co¬vering a
theoretically diverse body of works." Becker used theories of
symbolic interactionism; several others based their arguments on
Durkheim's functionalistic theories, while others used Marxist
conflict theory as their point of departure. Phenomenological
sociology, such as ethnomethodology, also began to be used
within the sociology of deviance.
My studies here deal with a, historically speaking, long
drawn-out process which repeatedly explodes in moral panic (the
social construction of deviance); I also analyse collective
behaviour, focussing on the function and role of rumour. As
mentioned above, I will use Norbert Elias' theories of the
established and the outsiders, and his observations about
gossip.
Pertaining to research on ethnicity and nationalism, I find
Benedict Anderson's concept of imagined community very useful -
the Alevi community is in many respects an excellent example of
this.
Having explored several different nationalist perspectives,
Ernest Gellner appears very convincing. He was one of those who
actually took care to look deeply into Islamic culture.
According to Gellner, the urban section of the population
submits to the state power and practices their religion in a
different way from the ethnic groups which are dispersed in the
mountain areas, since the latter, as far as possible, are able
to act outside of the state rules on what is permissible. A
composed, written doctrine fits the urban culture, while a less
codified, more extrovert religiosity centred on individuals is
more suitable for the "tribes". People are inside or outside the
state sphere, and this division is crucial, since it affects
various aspects of social life.
Naturally, I react negatively to such categorizing, but social
anthropologist David Shankland (who has lived with Alevis for
many years) happily accepts Gellner's theories. This invites
consideration.
Earlier research on Alevis and Sunnis in Turkey was mainly in
line with Gellner's thought: "Roughly speaking, there are two
dominant life-styles. In one of them, your women work in the
fields, are not secluded or veiled...social groups are very well
defined and visible, religious life is centred on public
festivals in which women play a very definite part, and which
reaffirm the identity and boundaries of groups."
In the second style, which can be applied to the Sunni Muslims
"ritual life is more sober, rule-bound, scripturalist,
individualised, anonymous, and has a more marked tendency to
exclude women."
Those who are independent, beyond central government and state
authorities, need functional mechanisms for resolving disputes.
Such groups have members who act as judges or mediators. In
these groups, holiness is interpreted in a special way and
persons who possess certain abilities are engaged to resolve
disputes or to mediate between antagonists. The chosen ones
enjoy certain privileges and the way in which the group
interprets holiness provides those who act as mediators with
protection. This affects many aspects of the society, including
gender politics.
According to Gellner, the secularised state protests against
those who inherit holiness and relatively autonomous groups with
such leaders run the risk of losing their independence under a
centralized state. Gellner also describes those who practice
their religion within the context of the nation state; these
people are resistant to secularism. (In the case of Turkey this
applies to the Sunni Muslims.) Thus, Islam is compatible with
modern nationalism.
In general, the Alevis try, as far as possible, to stay outside
of the various state regulations. The Alevis have built their
own community in opposition to the central government. The
"tribes" that Gellner describes, and which he calls penumbra
("half-shadow"), largely live in Anatolia, but the state has
endured their resistance. "The elite spoke Turkish, but did not
single out the Anato¬lian peasantry as its favored object. It
was a state elite, linked to the state, and it just happened to
speak Turkish. It was in the past identified with Islam, but it
controlled an ethnically and religiously variegated population."
Gellner's theories on Islam are interesting, and perhaps he is
right in claiming that Islamic societies will remain Islamic;
but maybe the Alevis, through their ceremonies and rituals can
contribute to a secularization of the Turkish state.
Various explanations pertaining to nationalism and
ethno-politics, and descriptions of the great threat to the
Turkish state that the Alevis are alleged to constitute, are
presented by several researchers. But an in-depth study of much
research material reveal that rumour, slander, stories of group
sex and general decadence, fanciful tales that depict the most
bestial, devilish happenings in the Alevi places of worship, and
spiteful descriptions that lable the Alevis as heretics, form
the basis of the persecution of Alevis since Osman times.
Ideally, in the following section I will present a historical,
social and political background, as well as a theoretical one,
in order to give the required initial parameters.
Overview
The situation for the Turkish Alevis is somewhat chaotic, which
is reflected here in the fact that I have not structured the
article in terms of temporalities and dimensions according to
different themes. Hopefully, analytical readers aware of
perspectives can imagine for themselves invisible headings such
as: (a) state-forming; (b) parties and social forces; (c) the
Alevis as a people, religion and movement, etc. Since the
beginning of the 1990s, the Alevis have attempted to become more
manifest as an ethnic minority group. All over Turkey, as well
as in European immigrant communities, Alevi movements have
arisen. Intellectual Alevis and leaders in various communities
strain to define the Alevi identity, tradition and the history
of the group.
The religion differs from Sunni Islam in that the Alevis do not
pray five times per day; they do not fast during Ramadan, are
not obliged to give alms, nor do they go on pilgrimage to Mecca.
Instead, they have their own religious ceremonies (cem) that are
led by holy men (dede) who inherit their vocation. At meetings,
religious poetry (nefes) is recited, Turkish Alevi songs are
sung and men and women perform ritual dances (semah) together.
'Ali and the Safavid Shah Isma'il are deified; at least they are
perceived as being superhuman. Pre-Islam Turkish and Iranian
religious elements have to a large extent been preserved among
the Alevis, but have vanished within Sunni Islam. It is, for
example, common that the Alevis make pilgrimages to holy sites,
such as springs and waterfalls, mountain tops and martyr graves.
Shari'a does not form the basis of their norms and values; the
Alevis have their own moral rules. Generally speaking, they
consider themselves to be living according to the inner meaning
of religion (batin), instead of following its outer demands
(zahir).
Alevism consists of several different communities whose beliefs
and ritual activities differ from each other to a relatively
large degree. Linguistically, four groups can be distinguished:
in the eastern province of Kars the Alevis speak Azerbaijan
Turkish; religiously, they are close to the Shi'ism of
present-day Iran (called the Sect of Twelve). 'Ali and his
descendants are regarded as infallible; they are illuminated by
the Divine Light. Here, there are obvious traces of Gnostic,
Neo-Platonic and Zoroastric motifs.
The Arabic-speaking Alevi community of southern Turkey (Hataya
and Adana) can be seen as an extension of the Alawit group in
Syria (called nuşairīs). Historically, these should not be
connected with the Turkish Alevis.
The two dominant groups are the Turkish-speaking and the
Kurdish-speaking Alevis. According to Gloria Clarke's thorough
study, we cannot claim that there is one homogenous community,
even if the same religious belief system is shared by the Alevis
and the Sufis belonging to Bektaşi, since there are regional
differences within each group. The Tunceli province is the
cultural centre of the Kurdish Alevis, but they live in villages
both in the south as well as in the east and west. Religiously,
both the Turkish and the Kurdish Alevis seem to be related to
the rebellious groups close to the Safavids. However, in his
research on the Kurds, Martin van Bruinessen claims that most of
today's Kurdish Alevis do not have ancestors who were Turkmens
or belonged to the hosts of Isma'il; but rather, they were
followers of other syncretic so called exaggerated (or
extremist) sects. In the 16th century, there were several
heterodox groups in Anatolia who had certain forms of contact
with each other.
As the Safavid dynasty extended, two significant religious
movements emerged among the groups mentioned above. In addition
to beliefs influenced by tasavvuf, there also arose a view which
was fıkıh oriented, probably because of the Safavid influence.
Otherwise, there is no evidence of Shi'ism in Anatolia before
the 16th century.
The identity struggle of the Alevis today is largely a question
of the choice between a Sufi doctrine, which is grounded in the
tasavvuf tradition, and imamet, which expresses the Shi'ia
elements in Alevism. Interestingly enough, this choice continues
to be a problem 400 years after the beginning of the Safavid
indoctrination. The Shi'ia features are of great importance for
the Alevi identity in the Sunni Muslim Turkish society.
The district from Gaziantep and Kahramanmaraş in the south
through Adıyaman to Malatya and Sivas in the north is ethnically
and religiously a very mixed area, consisting of a transitional
zone from Turkish Kurdistan in the south-east to the rest of the
country. Most of the clashes between the Sunni Muslims and the
Alevis in the 1970s took place in this zone. The latter usually
lived in relatively isolated mountain villages, which reflects
their history of being persecuted under the Osman Empire. Only
in the 1950s did the Alevis start to leave their villages to
settle in towns in the region, or to move to the large cities in
western Turkey.
The Sunni Muslims did not give up their prejudices against the
Alevis, even when the country was secularised. The Alevis were
accused of being sexually depraved and of leading an immoral
life. When the Alevis were integrated into the wider society
through urbanization, education and professional careers in the
public sector, they came into closer contact with the Sunni
Muslims. At times, the Alevis competed with the Sunnis over
means of livelihood; the Alevis were partly therefore perceived
as a threat towards those that they earlier had been totally
isolated from. This caused tensions in the Anatolian society,
particularly in the mixed areas of the smaller towns where
different ethnic and religious groups lived side by side.
However, problems also arose in the large cities of western
Turkey. Newly arrived villagers settled where people with the
same background lived, and thus distinctive Alevi quarters and
housing areas occupied solely by Alevis were created. The
political polarisation that accelerated in the 1970s aggravated
the situation. The left defined the Alevi uprisings of the past
as proto-communist events and regarded the Alevis as their
allies. The fascists and the religious extreme right therefore
tried to recruit conservative Sunni Muslims in the mixed
regions, partly by spreading fear for and hatred against the
Alevis. This provoked many violent incidents. Rumours of Alevi
bombings of mosques, or of the Alevis having poisoned the
drinking water resulted in many Sunni Muslims joining the
extreme right-wing movement. A number of violent clashes
culminated at the end of the 1970s with pogroms in Malatya,
Kahramanmaraş and Çorum.
The state was moving away from Kemalian ideas of a secular,
unified state with no classes and no ethnic or religious
differences. A strong, albeit divided, Kurdish movement and a
radical labour movement emerged at the end of the 1970s, at the
same time as frequent clashes between Sunnis and Alevis took
place - this signalled the end of Kemalism.
When Bülent Ecevit in 1972 took over leadership of the party
Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası/Partisi (CHP) founded by Kemal, it
developed into a Social Democratic party. But as Alpaslan Türkeş
was Vice Prime Minister in the 1970s, the youth organisation
within his party, Milliyetçi Haraket Partisi (MHP) turned into
the Grey Wolves, that is, "the Idealists" (ülkücüler), who came
to represent the extreme right.
After the military coup in September 1980, the aim was to
dispose of those who had instigated divisions in society. The
radical left and the Kurdish movement was decimated, but
Devrimci Sol (Dev Sol) and Par¬tiye Karkeran Kurdustan (PKK)
survived by going underground. Through repression the military
alienated the growing Kurdish population from state ideals and
thus contributed to an increasing support of the PKK, despite
rumours of violent actions.
At the turn of the year 1980, all leftist opinion was purged
from the police force which thus came to be dominated by
conservative Sunni Muslims and right-wing nationalists. On
several occasions, the police participated in activities
resulting in the murders of Alevis, which further widened the
rift between the state and the Alevis. The extreme right was
hardly ever punished for its actions. The fascist leader
Alpaslan Türkeş was not arrested in the correct way, despite his
being an accomplice to murder, and he was released without
trial. This is explained by the fact that Türkeş's movement was
integrated into the state machinery. Young right-wing extremists
no longer needed to carry out secret raids against "communist
tea-houses"; instead, they became policemen and school teachers,
or were recruited to the special forces set up to fight against
the Kurdish guerillas. In December 1991, Türkeş proclaimed war
against eastern and south-eastern Anatolia. The official
attitude towards Sunni Islam has, since 1980, constituted a
major step away from the Kemalist tradition.
Apparently in order to compete with Islamist fundamentalism, the
military actively developed its own version of Sunni Islam: the
Türk-Islam Sentezi. This Turkish-Islam synthesis, a disordered
doctrine combining intensive Turkish nationalism and Muslim
opinions, was formulated by a small group of right-wing
intellectuals as a response to socialism. Kenan Evren, leader of
the 1980 military coup, sympathised with the synthesis and
Turgut Özal, President of the country in 1989-1993, was another
of its followers.
This amalgamation was actually given the force of official
ideology and doctrine; it allowed President Evren (1980-1988) to
combine the Koran with Mustafa Kemal's political ideas in his
speeches. The synthesis legitimized the military regime; but
civilian politicians also later exploited it for their own gain.
They could regard themselves as real Turks with an Ottoman past
and liked to use Kemalist symbols for their Western-influenced
purposes.
As for the political arena and its development, the synthesis
proved to be a less successful solution. All Turks did not
strive for "Turkishness," and advocates for a "Westernising"
process fought against those championing Islamisation for the
leading position. The situation was such that when the
description of the state political goals gained support from a
certain group, it correspondingly provoked another group, which
was thus excluded - which, in turn, resulted in reduced
political participation. "Turkification excludes the Kurds and
does not offer them any solution other than assimilation."
The study of religion, which earlier had been a voluntary
subject, now became compulsory in all schools. Diyanet İşleri
Müdürlüğü, the Board for Religious Matters, which, among other
things, oversees the mosques in Turkey and abroad among Turks in
the Diaspora, increased its power base. Several mosques were
built and new Imams were appointed to oversee Alevi villages.
The Government apparently tried to force the Alevis into the
Sunni fold.
All the changes that took place in the 1980s resulted in a
renewed interest in the Alevi identity and many Alevis started
contemplating the Alevi religion. In the 1970s, young Alevis
were fairly uninterested in religion; for them Alevism was a
social movement. However, the leftist setbacks led many Alevis
to first regard the Alevi affiliation as a cultural identity,
and only later as a religious one. The leftist movements that
were supported all over the country in the 1970s had lost most
of their followers by the end of the 1980s. According to the
media, the left was then a non-religious Alevi movement, but its
members had started to reflect upon their Alevi identity. Many
Alevis had earlier already reacted against the alliance with the
Left and for a long time pondered their own religious tradition.
Naturally, the state support of Sunni Islam was of great
importance for the Alevi awakening. When the ban on religious
movements that had been in total force since 1980 was somewhat
relieved in 1989, Alevi societies developed in all parts of the
country. Cem rituals, which had been forbidden since 1925, were
carried out in public and places of worship (cemevi) were
opened.
Alevi writings were published, where intellectual Alevis
attempted to explain their history, Alevi doctrines and rituals
- and they also wished to define the relation of the Alevis to
Sunni Islam. Some books provoked heated discussions in the Alevi
community as to whether Alevism is an Islamic sect or a religion
of its own, and whether this separate religion is Iranian or
Turkish, etc.
This development influenced the nature of Alevism and caused it
to change. From having been a local, secret movement with
initiation rites and an oral tradition that was known only to
the select, Alevism suddenly became a formalised public religion
with written doctrines and rituals. Most Alevis did not belong
to the class of religious leaders who had always held a monopoly
on ritual competence and claimed to possess superior knowledge
of the tradition. Now, however, most had received a modern
education and the new texts reflected the mentality dominating
the educational system - all very Kemalian. Even now, changes
are taking place as Alevi writers continue to reformulate the
tradition and sometimes they express things in a way quite
typical for followers of nationalist movements in the making.
This renaissance of Alevi identity and religion was encouraged
by secular persons within the political establishment,
particularly by politicians who have always regarded the Alevis
as their friends in the struggle against political Islam.
Politically, Alevis have existed across the whole spectrum of
parties in Turkey. However, the party that has been most popular
among the Alevis is he Social Democrat Cumhuriyet Halk Par¬tisi
(CHP),which has had many Alevi delegates and representatives. In
1991, CHP became a subordinate party in the government coalition
together with Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP, "the True Path Party")
lead by Süleyman Demirel (later by Prime Minister Tansu Çiller)
Since many Alevi Kurds supported PKK at the end of the 1980s,
the state authorities tried to stimulate "Alevism" as an
alternative to Kurdish identity. At the beginning of the 1990s,
the state openly supported the Alevis, for example by publicly
sponsoring the annual festival celebrating Haci Bektaş Veli. In
the 1970s, this festival was a gathering place for radicals;
during in 1980s it gradually became less political and in the
1990s it got the support and protection of the Government. Now
politicians from all parties participate in order to show how
much they care about the Alevis.
During the 1990s, the state recognised the more conservative
Alevis and their leaders were elected into the state apparatus;
with their support the Turkey-based nationalism was to be
strengthened. At the same time, many authorities were suspicious
of the Alevis because of their earlier connections with the
Left. There were many within the police force and in certain
government departments who clearly demonstrated their contempt
of Alevis. Nevertheless, many Alevis were gratified by the
acknowledgement expressed in the fact that Alevis were elected
into the political establishment. Hacı Bektaş came to be a
symbol for loyalty to the Turkish state. During the initial
stages of the state, many Alevis in the countryside had actually
whispered that Mustafa Kemal was an incarnation of Hacı Bektaş.
Historically, the Bektaşi movement played an important role in
integrating heterodox religious groups and so called
troublemakers into the Osman Empire. This Sufi order strongly
supported Mustafa Kemal during the War of Independence and, as
indicated above, during the first years of the Republic Kemal
was perceived by many religious Alevis as an reincarnation of
Hacı Bektaş.
Around 1990 this theme was revived and an Alevi author presented
Haci Bektaş as a proto-nationalist; some called him ülkücü
("idealist", a term that extreme natio¬nalists and fascists in
the Türkeş party has earlier monopolised, see footnote 18
above).
The nationalist discourse prevalent in the country has
influenced both Kurdish and Turkish Alevis. Many of the Kurdish
Alevis have sided with the Kurdish nationalists and among the
Turkish Alevis there have been expressions of Turkish
nationalism and even racism. These political choices are totally
alien to the Alevi tradition.
Going back to the mid-1990s, there were no Alevis who would have
emphasized that they were Turkish or Kurdish - an
ethnic-national identity did not matter - they belonged to
Alevilik, which was regarded as a religious community. Now, it
is often the case that common symbols are defined according to
ethnic traits in discussions dealing with the nation. Hacı
Bektaş, who is the protector of the Alevis, is also the patron
saint of Turkish nationalists. Therefore, those who place their
Kurdish identity above their Alevi identity have made the rebel
and poet Pir Sultan Abdal their sym¬bolic protector.
The rebel saint Pir Sultan Abdal (1510/1514-1589/1590) lived in
Banaz, a village in the Sivas ¬province, and he was hanged in
the city of Sivas. When the Pir Sultan Abdal Association
organized a cultural festival there in July 1993, the city was
made their meeting place. Sivas is one of the provinces with a
large Alevi population, both Turkish and Kurdish-speaking, but
the towns in the province are dominated by conservative Sunni
Muslims.
The festival was opposed by means of aggressive demonstrations,
staged by the ultra right movement and reactionary Sunni
Muslims. They demolished a statue of Pir Sultan Abdal that had
been erected by the festival organisers. Instead of being
calmed, the mob was egged on by a speech given by the Mayor (who
belonged to the right-wing party for Muslim welfare). The
demonstrators surrounded a hotel where festival participants
were staying; they then attacked the hotel and threw stones and
burning rags through the windows. The agitated mob set the hotel
on fire and 37 people were killed in the flames.
This confrontation in Sivas differed from the attacks against
the Alevis in the late 1970s; it was not a massive assault on
Alevi neighbourhoods. Probably Aziz Nesin and some intellectual
Alevis were the main targets, as was the statue of Pir Sultan,
above all as a symbol for the Alevi leftist tradition and the
Kurds. In this context, the actions of the local police and the
civil authorities that were part of the demonstrators are of
great significance, as is the Government's
inability/unwillingness to neutralise the powers that were on
the move.
The Mayor openly sympathised with the demonstrators and the
police did not in any way try to scatter them or hinder them
from reaching the hotel; neither did they take any noticeable
action when the hotel caught fire. When the hotel was
surrounded, Aziz Nesin and some of his friends managed to reach
the Vice Prime Minister Erdal Inönü by phone. He answered that
an order had already been sent to Sivas that the festival
participants were to be protected. This order had no effect
whatsoever. A police film of the events, which happened to reach
the press, shows that the police received orders over the radio
not to stop the demonstrators as they attacked the hotel. Most
policemen just stood and watched as the hotel burned.
Nevertheless, some did help and a policeman happened to save
Aziz Nesin. However, when others among the police noticed this,
they started beating the exhausted man; nevertheless, he was
protected by others and taken to hospital.
The tension between the Government and the Alevis increased
further when the police and Alevis clashed in the Gazi area of
Istanbul in March 1995. This is a poor area with a large Alevi
population. On the evening of 12 March armed men drove a stolen
taxi through the neighbourhood and fired directly into five
different tea-houses. One person was killed and several wounded.
The police took a long time arriving at the scene and might very
well have been involved in the incident. As a reaction to this,
crowds of people gathered and young people took over the streets
in protest against the attack.
Youth gangs started demonstrating outside the police
headquarters in the areas that were governed by right-wing
extremists and policemen who were against Alevis. Recently, an
Alevi held in custody at the headquarters had been tortured to
death. There were clashes between Alevis and policemen
everywhere in the area. Shops were destroyed and the police shot
a demonstrator, which also caused unrest in neighbouring areas
of the city. Youngsters threw stones at the police and built
barricades, while sensible Alevi leaders tried to calm the
masses. Instead of using conventional methods, the police lost
their heads and fired into the crowds, killing 15 more people.
The patronizing language used by the police shouting at the
Alevi leaders who were trying to mediate, shows that the actions
of many policemen were based on an intense hatred against
Alevis. However, there were also policemen who attempted to hold
back their colleagues, but did not succeed in doing so.
Both the hotel fire in Sivas and the clashes in Istanbul reveal
that the state sided with the attackers. The authorities of the
central government had no control over the police force, which
since 1980 had consisted of extreme right-wing Sunni Muslims.
So, Turkish society was deeply divided; the rift was also
splitting the Government, whose conservative members said
outright that it was the fault of Aziz Nesin that the arson in
Sivas had taken place. Earlier in the year, Nesin had announced
that he was going to translate Salman Rushdie's The Satanic
Verses into Turkish, which was taken as provocation in Islamist
circles.
Today's Alevis strongly oppose the idea of an Islamist state. A
majority supports social democratic politics, but after the
massacres in Sivas, new alternatives have emerged. The political
agenda includes, for example, a suggestion of an Alevi party.
The events mentioned above supported a revival and radicalized
the Alevi process of renewal. Alevi leaders who try to
co-operate with the state authorities have lost the support of
the people. Young Alevis today are radical and the Government's
attempts to present the Alevi identity as an alternative to
Kurdish nationalism has failed. The alienation created by the
clashes brought the Alevis closer to the PKK, even if Kurdish
Alevis, up to 1991, rarely sympathised with the separatist
party. The state's close relations to the Sunni majority had in
1994 resulted in many Alevis giving the PKK their support. All
the same, a majority of the Alevis define themselves primarily
as Alevis and only secondly as Kurds. State-supported
publications emphasize, however, that Alevism is a special
Turkish form of Islam and that all Alevis essentially are Turks.
Kurdish nationalists therefore try to convince Alevis that the
most important identity is the Kurdish one, and that the Alevi
religion is part of an Iranian, Zoroastric tradition, rather
than of Turkish origin. Thus, Turkish Alevis are also
religiously more closely related to Kurds that to Turks. Even
Zaza-speaking Kurds, of whom some are Alevis and others Shafi'it
Sunni Muslims, started to voice nationalist feelings in the
1990s, even if those who speak this Dimili language (which
belongs to the Pahlawâni group) have never formed a distinct
ethnic group. The general trend is that in the areas where
Alevis have been murdered by Sunnis it does not matter whether
one is Kurd or Turk, since the primary identity is the religious
one.
Today, many Alevis with socialist views regard members of the
PKK as their allies, since the Alevis face extreme right-wing
political forces which strongly influence the actions of the
Government. The members of the conservative, religious and
ultra-nationalist block are not interested in cultural and
religious pluralism, and they counteract compromises with both
Kurds and Alevis. In its struggle to create a monolithic state
and a uniform society, this political block is the most
disruptive force in present day Turkey.
Already the results from the 1995 elections showed that identity
politics are the current issue in Turkey. The three parties
which then represented different group identities - the Fazilet
Partisi which stood for an Islamis¬t identity, the Milliyetçi
Haraket Partisi representing the ultra-nationalist Turkish
identity and Halkın Demokrasi Partisi that officially functioned
as the mouthpiece for the Kurds - obtained approximately one
third of all the votes. The growing interest among the Alevis in
their Alevi identity is also underlined, while at the same time,
the important role of the Alevis for Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi
(CHP) is mentioned.
"The Alevis" in the definite form is an example of an Alevi
self-image in the Diaspora. Thus, when I write of "the Alevis",
I am influenced by those living here in Sweden, since it is the
expression of something impossible except as a
self-representation created by Alevis outside of Turkey (or by
those who know European languages). This is so, because there is
no definite article in the Turkish language.
Can it be the case that this definite form, used in the
self-description of Alevis in the Netherlands and Sweden,
reflects the hopes for the existence of a form that denotes
something known by its characteristics, that is, the hope for
such a form being a reality? The definite form seems to be the
means by which the Alevis with a distance to the authoritative
state can create a discourse which is also conveyed through
their actions: - We are the carriers of a definite form!
Deviance
Deviance is not an absolute phenomenon; cultures are reshaped
and symbolic-moral borders change (or remain stable). Agreements
pertaining to the character of morality are compiled with rules
deciding how power is to be executed and what is legitimized as
power when a nation state is being created.
What legitimizes power is a moral order that also defines the
borders between various symbolic-moral worlds in society.
Behavioural patterns demonstrated and acts taking place at the
limits, where different worlds border on each other, are seen as
problematic and insulting, and therefore they challenge both
power and morality. Such acts labelled as problematic are
deviant and political. Deeds that directly and explicitly
challenge the social order, or are aimed against the power and
morality of the central government, are politically deviant
behaviour.
What, then, constitutes deviant behaviour? Generally speaking,
deviance is a breach of norms, but it can also be a sociological
construction of an analytical concept. Deviance is connected to
changes in symbolic universes.
When a certain etiquette is created, that is, a convincing
social construction which people adopt and use (this could take
the form of labelling that which is deviant), there are some
features that determine whether the construction manages to
effectively claim that this or that particular incident
constitutes deviant behaviour. The group passing judgment must,
for example, possess enough power to enforce their definition
and version of morality on others. This is a process that
underlines and accentuates the borders between different
symbolic-moral worlds. Negotiations on the moral significance of
rhetorical ideas are a continuous process between the deviant
and the community in which he or she lives and acts. From an
analytical perspective, deviance is always a consequence of
agreements reached concerning morality and the way in which
power relations are shaped.
According to this viewpoint, deviance is a relative phenomenon,
a subjective experience and an intentional act. Even if there
are norms that seem universal and not relative, for example that
it is forbidden to kill another person, there are rhetoric
notions (such as "blood feud") which justifies and explains why
somebody's life has been taken against the will of that person;
there are also ritual situations that occasionally are termed
vendettas, human sacrifice or duels. Some car accidents are also
classified as "the taking of another person's life"; the police
kill sometimes "in self-defence", and then there are those who
regard abortion as murder. So, it seems to be the case that the
rationalisation of these acts is something conditioned. Both
theft and swindling are also relative concepts. In other words,
it is generally difficult to draw any hard and fast moral
borders as to what is right and wrong, suitable and unsuitable.
Power and morality are used to mark socially constructed
differences between various groups.
In Turkey, there are several symbolic-moral worlds; one world
negotiates with another and within each community the members
negotiate amongst themselves. These negotiations are expressed
through, for example, criminalization and stigmatization.
Deviant behaviour is a central element in a functioning society.
In politics, deviance clearly brings about social change. When
it comes to power and moral politics, deviant behaviour can
maintain specific symbolic-moral universes through the depiction
of particular behavioural patterns as bad, evil, contaminating
and impure. However, analyses of political deviance and
political elements present in that which is deviant show that
deviance is often connected to processes of change. A questioned
behaviour can be used during a process of nation building to
construct the imagined community within which new personal and
national identities and moral borders are shaped.
It is the combination of power and morality which lies at the
basis of what is defined as deviance and what is not. The
eternal play between competing moral entrepreneurs, the symbolic
moral universes which they help to create, define, and maintain
(and in which they are trapped), and the power which they are
able to generate, mobilize, and utilize - these have always
deter¬mined the demarcation between deviance and non-deviance.
It is not necessarily the powerful that ascribe the powerless
with a deviant behaviour; it might just as easily be the case
that a group with no actual power persuades those belonging to
another sphere, another symbolic-moral universe, that we do this
in the name of God, and thus power is generated and an agreement
on morality is created. Moral universes and moral borders,
In Turkey, the Sunni Muslim majority regard themselves as being
the wardens of the righteous symbolic-moral universe and its
borders, even if the society is officially secularised.
Collective deviance refers to the fact that members of some
categories of people stigmatise all members of a certain other
category, simply because of the affiliation of these group
members. This is partly a question of Erving Goffman's stigma
types. It is, of course, not politically correct to ascribe
"deviance" to a minority group, but nevertheless the Alevis in
Turkey are pointed out as deviant. Stigma "can be transmitted
through lineages and equally contaminate all members of a
family". What he calls "the tribal stigma of religion" does not
only pertain to religion as a belief system, but also in the
sense of "belonging to a religious category" - a group status -
regardless of individual beliefs. "Religion", according to
Goffman's tribal stigma, belongs to a categorical way of
thinking, which some use to typify some or all persons that the
label can be applied to. In this case, deviant behaviour is a
quality not attached to an individual but to an entire
collective. A person is deviant because he or she belongs to a
certain group, the membership of which is stigmatizing.
Moral panic, society's reaction to deviance, often has quite
obscure reasons. Politicians, writers and representatives of the
majority religion do not react as rats in a laboratory on
arbitrary stimuli - they react on the basis of positions,
status, interests, ideologies and values. Their way of reacting
to rumour is not only related to the rumour itself and its
message; the crucial thing is whether the rumours can provide
support to their own special interests.
Morality is connected to unity and solidarity with one's own
people, in this case the Turks. Turkishness is an identity that
implies Sunni Muslim affiliation. Those who choose another
belief are disloyal to the Turkish state. Greeks, Jews and
Armenians have been acknowledged since the 1923 Lausanne Treaty,
but Alevis are not yet accepted; they are regarded as deviant.
The lack of norms ascribed to the Alevis by the Sunni majority
forms the basis for the moral panic that the massacres in the
Kahramanmaraş province are an expression of. Lack of norms, or
anomie, which is described by Robert Merton in his article
"Social Structure and Anomie" (1938), is a problem already
suggested by Durkheim in Suicide (1897).
According to Merton's functionalist perspective, deviant
behaviour can be evoked by disturbed circles, that is, because
the order in society is upset. Disturbances in the traditional
social order lead to anomie, which results in some people
displaying deviant behaviour. When the Alevis moved into towns,
having made money on their small farms, they were labelled as
abnormal. When they adopted socialist politics they were
regarded as deviant: "social structures exert a definite
pressure upon certain persons in the society to engage in
non-con¬forming rather than conforming conduct."
In the eyes of Durkheim, opposite is true: the anomie disturbs
the social order, creating a situation where there are no norms,
when convention is no longer able to control people's behaviour.
Durkheim thought that when norms were dissolved, people behaved
in any way they pleased. But Merton's view of anomie is totally
different: deviance does not emerge because society lacks norms
and is weakened, on the contrary, a society with strict moral
rules can actually provoke deviant behaviour. When two
perceptions, or spheres, are set up against each other as
mutually exclusive alternatives, anomie can be discerned in a
disjunction between culturally defined goals and structurally
available opportunities.
The Alevis had their own religious, cultural system and their
own places of worship, but the Sunni Muslim culture and mosques
were forced on them. They are Merton's rebels - through another
religion they abandon the mosque, the holy central pillar of the
town, and place themselves on the political left, against all
the established norms of the town-dwellers. When the means of
the majority are totally different from those of the minority,
it does not matter if they have the same goal. Deviant behaviour
is that which does not conform to the institutionalized
expectations of the majority.
Since the Alevis were not greeted with open arms by the
suspicious Sunni Muslims in the towns, they kept to themselves.
They were not very successful in the traditional sector; the
conservative forces of society forced them to take a stance
against the existing order, which happened by choosing a
socialist line, and this was perceived as deviant behaviour. But
positivism, represented by Merton, is related to essentialism,
and the approach becomes rigid. The borders are not so clear in
reality; the differences are not so easy to point out.
Conservative observers think that the sociology of deviance is
an untenable way of studying social transgression. This is so
because we know what is bad through our own tradition. Thus, in
Sunni Muslim society it is regarded as deviant not to attend
Friday prayers, not to follow the Five Pillars of Islam, etc.
But the sociology of deviance is not about defining evil;
deviance is that which is regarded as wrong, not what is
fundamentally wrong. Sociological theories on deviance explore
that which is represented as deviant: "deviance is a universal,
trans-cultural, trans-histori¬cal concept." Societies
institutionalize rules for correct behaviour and indicate what
is incorrect behaviour; those who break the rules are punished.
The Alevis are regarded as collectively deviant: "Collective
deviance simply means that one is automatically discredited as a
result of belonging to a racial, national, ethnic, and religious
category of humanity."
In a society that has been "forcibly secularised", many
believers appear to be very conservative in religious matters.
They are very quick to condemn that which is "different".
"The ordinary Sunni Muslim believes that his way of life, his
beliefs and his religious practice constitute the certain and
correct path (sırat-ı müstakim), since they are based on the
holy book, the words and deeds of the prophet, the
interpretations of religious scholars (ulema) and the consent of
the Muslim community at large (ümmet). The traditional belief is
that these have not changed for centuries." Since hadith and
içtihad are based on divine inspiration, the unchanged tradition
is holy. All changes that have been imposed by the state the
Imams have simply disregarded; this is a case of a kind of quiet
disobedience: people continue to practice Islam in the
traditional way, regardless of what the state theologians say.
Conservative Imams say what the people want to hear: "that they
should go on doing what they presumably have always done, that
this is prescribed by Islam."
When the nationalist and secularist Zekeriya Beyaz, Professor of
Theology, suggested a law that chickens could be sacrificed
during the religious festival of Kurban, the Imams in the
mosques read from a book of interpretations made by Kemal's
chosen theologian Ömer Nasuhi Bilmen Hodja. Only sheep, goats,
camels and cows can be sacrificed, while chickens, hens and
geese must not be sacrificed; offering them as sacrifice is
religiously abominable (mekruh), since such customs are
reminiscent of those that the Mecusis (this refers to Zoroastric
traditions and indirectly to Alevis) practice. Chicken sacrifice
is a Mecusi custom! By laying claim to a general custom,
supported by references to Kemal's theologian, the Imam can
satisfy the people without irritating the state authorities. The
rites of the religion must not be renewed
Rumours and gossip
When the Alevis settled in the small towns in the Kah¬ramanmaraş
province bringing with them habits which were totally different
from those of the Sunnis, they disturbed the order. However, it
was the rumours of immorality, in combination with the communist
label, which egged reactionary Sunni Muslim groups on to violent
action.
Collective behavior is defined as behavior that is relatively
spontaneous, volatile, evanescent, emergent,
extra-institutional, and short-lived; it emerges or operates in
situations in which there are no, or few adequate, clearcut
definitions as to what to do from mainstream culture. Collective
behavior operates outside the stable, patterned structures of
society; it reflects the "maverick" side of human nature.
Compared with conventional, everyday life, collective behavior
is less inhibited and more spontaneous, more changeable and less
structured, shorter-lived and less stable.
In Folk Devils and Moral Panics (1972), Stanley Cohen mentions
that certain forms of collective behaviour are significant for
moral panic: mass hysterics , misconceptions within a large
group, catastrophes and collapses following such, riots, crowds
and throngs, slander, rumours, and legends.
A rumour is both a process and a product, a catalyst that
accelerates the process of collective behaviour and a kind of
collective behaviour in its own right. It is, on the one hand, a
mechanism that characterizes collective behaviour, an on the
other, an example of such behaviour. Rumours are commonly
regarded as narratives that per definition are false, but
researchers do not define a rumour on the basis of its possible
incorrectness, or based on the contents of the rumour at all,
but on the lack of evidence, since rumours are unconfirmed
accusations. The definition of rumour is that it is passed on
without documentation of reliable facts. Rumours might certainly
be verified or falsified at a later point in time, but the
important aspect here is that rumours per definition are
unconfirmed. Rumour is hearsay, rumours are narrated, regarded
as true and passed on, not because of the proof presented, but
because those spreading the rumours expect the narratives to be
true.
Four factors ease the spreading process: (1) topicality (the
subject is seen as important) and that the result is relevant
for the one who lets him or herself be involved in the spreading
of rumours; (2) uncertainty and ambiguity; (3) personal fear or
worry; (4) gullibility or credulity.
When gullible people feel afraid of a certain group, because the
situation is ambiguous and uncertain, and the contents of the
rumour are such that what is said might possibly worsen the life
situation of those who hear it, they probably believe it.
Generally speaking, a story of something insignificant (having
less important consequences) is not a source for speculation.
Rumours about events that do not matter for the hearer, that do
not affect his or her life, are seldom passed on. For example,
Swedes do not spread rumours about the price of camels in
Afghanistan, since we do not care about how much a camel costs
there. Thus, rumours grow and spread at high speed under certain
conditions, particularly when the subject being aired is of
great significance for those who engage in the spreading of the
rumour.
Often the context is problematic, the rumour deals with
something that is not familiar and the uncertainty makes the
rumour-spreaders unsure. Worry and anxiety are both personal and
structural; some people worry more easily than others and
certain circumstances create more general worry than others do.
"Rumor flies on fear." Anxious people tend to pass on rumours,
compared with more secure people, who do not do this to the same
extent. Additionally, more rumours are spread in unpleasant
situations than normally, and are then perceived as credible.
A person, who believes in the claims of others without any
reflection, is also keen to pass on what is being said, since he
or she does not want to appear sceptical and critical. Rumours
appear to be the truth to the gullible. Those who are sceptical
and question the truthfulness of hearsay are the enemies of
rumour.
The Sunni Muslims in Kahramanmaraş were very ignorant about the
ways and customs of the Alevis, which naturally contributed to
their uncritical attitude when rumours were being spread. Gossip
can be seen as improvised news that is spread when information
is lacking. News flying about is symptomatic of people trying to
solve problems that befall their own community; rumours help
them cope with things that they feel insecure about.
Tamnotsu Shibutani, who studied rumour in the 1960s, looked for
cognitive and rational factors. When a subject was fairly
uninteresting and not very exciting, people were quite critical
and scrutinized the sources of the rumours spreading, but when
they were keen to know something and the news information was
nonexistent, they had a great unsatisfied need. The subjective
excitement was then strong and the interest enormous; in such
circumstances many improvised and rumours appeared spontaneously
- any sources would do.
But Goode and Ben-Yehuda think that a rumour is an irrational
process, since rumours represent people's need to get their
deeply rooted opinions and notions verified; it is not a
question of exploring concrete facts. Rumours often confirm
affiliation and virtue for those who are insiders and victimise
somebody else; those who are outsiders are exploited and made
the object of malice.
Moral panic is something that hinders people from making
critical judgements. In the midst of moral panic people perceive
the supposed threat as being directed against them personally,
but they are unsure of its exact significance. The Others (who
are perceived as threatening) make the anxious people
suspicious, which results in those who are worrying wanting more
information on the threatening than is available - therefore
they lower the threshold and become less critical towards
rumour.
For example, religious fundamentalists are inclined to believe
that devil-worshippers sexually abuse children and kill a lot of
children every year. Agnostics, atheists and religious sceptics
do not have the same tendency to spread rumours about Satanists.
Rumour-spreaders often have a low level of education, live in
the countryside, are more traditional and worry about the
secular trends in society, such as women working outside the
home. Here, we can see parallels with the Sunni Muslims in the
Anatolian towns.
Individuals in ethnically divided communities tend to see the
other ethnic group as threatening, and rumours about what the
Others have done to members of their own group are common.
"Rumor is one of the basic processes that both fuels and is
fueled by the moral panic. A moral panic sets the stage and
provides a context for rumormongering; when rumors take place,
they provide the justification for fears, exaggeration, and a
sense of threat. Rumor is a vital element in the moral panic. It
is one of the reasons why moral panic must be regarded as a form
of collective behaviour."
When there is a difference in power between two mutually
dependent and interacting groups, this disparity contributes to
the creation of a notion of different moral values of the
groups. Persons who possess power see themselves as being
better, that is more moral, than people who do not have power.
The established group tries to force a definition on the other
group, of both their own insider group and the other,
representing outsiderness. Power differences between groups are,
according to this argument, produce different levels of moral
status. According to Norbert Elias, it is "the way in which
outsiders are treated that explains why some of them come to act
and behave in precisely the ways that are morally encumbering.
Elias describes a kind of group charisma, attached to one's own
group, and a group shame, ascribed to those who are outsiders.
The superior majority with power tries to get the minority to
realize that they lack the virtues of the insider group, and
that they therefore are morally inferior.
The higher value that the established group regards themselves
as having is set against the Others' group shame. An emotional
barrier obstructs contact with the outsider group; for
generation after generation there might be a taboo against any
closer relations, but changes can create a
"counter-stigmatisation in a power struggle where the difference
slowly shrinks".
By ascribing superior qualities to their own group, the majority
motivates a social exclusion of the Others. By using rumour and
banning contacts isolation is maintained, "the group's ability
to stay unified is the basis for its power... [and] the moral
differentiation plays an important part for both establishing
and maintaining power differences".
Elias' thoughts can be summarised in the following theses:
a) an imbalance in the power relation between two groups who are
closely dependent on each other creates a hierarchy of moral
valuation of the groups and their members;
b) the moral valuation of the groups is central to the (power)
relation between them;
c) the ascribing of moral value is a central mechanism for
upholding the superiority of the established group and for
creating and maintaining the inferiority and lower status of the
subordinate group;
d) the symptoms of human inferiority that a powerful,
established group tends to perceive in a subordinate outsider
group are the behaviours and features that are created by the
very outsiderness and the oppression and inferiority thus
following.
As in Winston Parva (in the study that Elias uses as his basis
for the analysis of insiders and outsi¬ders), a valuation and
stigmatising process is also discernible in the Kahramanmaraş
province.
"The newcomers were seen as a threat to established norms,
values and ways of life, including behavioural codes. By
excluding the newcomers, the established confirmed their own
identity, created differences in the notions of the groups,
while at the same time the unity was the power resource that
enabled the maintaining of the differences."
Charisma stands against dishonour and shame, and contacts with
members of the immoral minority were impossible for the Sunni
Muslims in Kahramanmaraş in 1978, since this would have
constituted a threat against an individual's position in his or
her own group. According to Elias' argument, people can be
"subjected to 'contact contamination', since the outsider group
by definition is supposed to have a lower moral status. The
categories by which the outsider group is described are as such
strong expressions of subordination and shaming".
In line with Elias' description, on Alevis in the eyes of
Sunnis: "…their behaviour got the old inhabitants to feel that
each closer contact with them might threaten their own position,
drag them down to a lower level of status both in their own eyes
and those around them, harm the prestige of the neighbourhood
with all the instances of pride and satisfaction that it
offered."
A complex weave of unity and interaction based on practices
created power relations between the established majority in
Kahramanmaraş and a minority that had moved to the town from
mountain villages. If we regard charisma as a kind of risk,
religion is important and makes social interaction predictable.
Elias often disregards religion in his extensive explanation of
the civilization process, but this does not make his argument
less convincing, since the paradigms of the figurations still
include religious institutions. I turn to religion in order to
find an answer to the question as to what "Alevi" is.
The Alevis - a closely united group?
Alevilik is the name of a community where membership is defined
through origins. It stands for a strong, special collective
identity, and seen from a formalist perspective, the Alevis
demonstrate characteristics that are often used when identifying
an ethnic group. In this essay, I use the term Alevism for the
Turkish Alevilik, which is also translated as Alevitism. The
term carries both ideological and sociological meanings:
Alevilik is a belief system, it is a particular community;
earlier, the term also represented leftist opinions, which today
are no longer characteristic of Alevis.
Once more, it needs to be emphasized that a more religiously
defined identity was set aside during the 1970s, and replaced by
socialism. In the beginning of the 1980s, Alevis were not
mentioned at all; the military coup in 1980 contributed to
erasing Alevilik from the public mind. Since the late 1980s, a
process of restructuring is going on, which initially was a
community revival in Turkish media, and Alevis in the Diaspora
published their own newspapers (in German, English, Dutch and
French).
The Alevis are seeking their identity in a political climate
coloured by conservative Sunni Muslim values. The worry that the
Alevis experienced because of the increasing Islamisation of
Turkish society made them look for ideological alternatives,
placing their hopes in universalist ideas of the Enlightenment.
Many Alevi leaders, who earlier were engaged in the socialism
then associated with the so called Third World, have found it
problematic to address Post-Modern ideologies. Representatives
of the community, who had universalist ideas, became
increasingly aware of the conflicting interests between their
explicit universalist orientation and the particular form of an
Alevi renaissance that they were fighting for. This resulted in
political irresolution. At this stage of the development, the
religious identity and the new ethno-political identities were
set against each other.
Generally speaking, three different standpoints dominate the
Alevilik debate. The traditional religious elite regard Alevilik
as the true form of Islam, but because of the old
Turkish-Iranian conflicts, representatives of the elite want to
clean Alevilik of Shi'ia elements and shape the religion in a
more Sunni-oriented direction. This view of Alevism contains
certain conditions the need to be fulfilled if Alevilik is to be
openly acknowledged, for example, the Alevis must recognize the
Five Pillars of Islam and men must attend Friday prayers at
Sunni Muslim mosques.
Another group defines Alevilik as a secularised belief based on
folkloristic elements. The adherents of this view see Alevism as
an ethno-political unity alongside Sunnis and Shi'is.
The third standpoint is based on the opinions of a coalition
between modern and traditional Alevis. The heterodox and
syncretic structure of Alevilik is important; the community does
not stand for "a secular belief", nor is it an expression of
"true Islam". It is, however, problematic to pass on an eclectic
tradition, a theosophy which earlier has only been transmitted
orally. Thus, the migration into towns gave rise to the need for
an Alevi theology. Some advocate association with the teachings
of the Bektaşi order, since Alevis and Bektaşi members have
historically always been connected; others go one step further
and think that a bridge between Alevis and Sunni Muslims can be
built with the aid of Bektaşi Sufism.
Alevis who look for their identity in adjacent religions (Sunni
or Shi'ia), the first standpoint described above, will probably
be integrated into one of those two religions and religious
communities.
The Alevilik now being formed is, to a large extent, a matter of
the definition of who actually is an Alevi. Traditionally,
members are born into the community, and those wanting to
establish an ethno-political community think it would be easier
to let origins set the socio-political basis. But should those
external to the group who refer to the Declaration of Human
Rights regard Alevilik as a separate unit? These Alevis do,
after all, define Alevilik in accordance with universal values.
Such questions cause problems in the debate. Those trying to
combine traditional and modern values also have their dilemmas.
By defining Alevilik as a belief system, they can easily
distinguish between Alevis and non-Alevis, but many Alevis are
not religious believers and they see Alevilik as something
universal. All those who want to define themselves as Alevis
should have the right to do so; if a belief is the basis of
existence and a distinctive character, non-religious Alevis are
deprived of the Alevi identity.
When identity suddenly becomes a matter of self-definition, all
leaders who are seen as having inherited their position, are
threatened. If anybody can become an Alevi, soon anybody can
become leader. Many of the clergy therefore underline the
importance of origins. By emphasizing concepts such as "true
religion" and the pure line that, according to tradition, goes
back to 'Ali, those in authority underline that their leadership
is legitimate and that their position cannot be questioned. This
argument is interesting for the discussion about an allegiance
between Alevis and Bektaşi members. Bektaşi is a Sufi Order and
membership is voluntary; Alevis and Sufis previously had totally
different social, cultural and religious identities.
The Bektaşi Order had its members in larger and smaller cities;
the Sufis often came from a middle-class background, but also
from lower classes. When starting to consciously look for an
identity, many Alevis joined Sufi fraternities -
Alevi-Bektaşilik was an increasingly common name for the
alliance. However, there were practical problems, since the
Bektaşi members elect their leaders in accordance with the fact
that the Sufis reject the idea of inherited leadership.
Furthermore, the Alevis had always been organised around the
home and oriented towards the private sphere. However, because
of the political development in Turkey, its future membership of
the European Union, etc., the Alevis have become more extrovert.
Today, politically active Alevis are turning to non-Alevis
calling for their attention. Some claim that both Sunni Muslims
and Christians have converted to Alevilik - which is perceived
as provocative information by conservative Sunni Muslims.
Despite their differences, the Alevis are close to the Bektaşi
when it comes to matters of faith, and the heritage from many
religions (that are layered in Anatolia) survive in their common
beliefs:
Apart from an advanced pantheism (which is shared by many Sufi
movements), Gnostic thoughts were also included. For example,
belief in transmigration seems to have been very common.
Depending on one's merits, after death one's soul could either
be elevated to the spiritual world, or enter an animal with
characteristics similar to one's own. There were also traces of
old Turkish Shamanism, in the form of certain taboo animals, for
example the hare and the bear. From a social perspective the
Bektashi Order was unique in the Islamic world in that it
allowed women to be included as full members and partake in the
rituals on an equal basis. Outsiders regarded this as utterly
shocking, and it gave rise to rumours about unspeakable orgies.
The identity now being shaped is, to a large extent, based on
religion. When the Alevis lived in mountain village in central
Anatolia, they could convey antagonistic messages of a religious
nature orally, whereas today written texts are required and this
changes the circumstances. If they leave out inherited
leadership in order to merge with the Bektaşi more permanently,
the Alevis probably have better prospects of being accepted into
Turkish national politics. But if they hold on to imamet,
meaning that the clergy is divinely enlightened and pure, and
descended from Mohammed and 'Ali, they will be regarded as
Shi'ia Muslims. This, in turn, implies a closer allegiance with
Iran than with the Turkish state, which will worsen the Alevis'
situation in Turkey. Thus, it is of great importance for their
future whether velayet or imamet is to be the basis for Alevi
leadership. Through personal effort, an individual can become a
veli or a perfect man or woman (insan-ı kamil) with direct
knowledge of God. In this context, pertaining to the concept of
velayet, the principle of lineage is irrelevant.
In fact, the unified group is a new invention and perhaps only
an illusory construction. Nevertheless, this possible unity is
always emphasised. "In spite of this potential unity, the Alevis
today appear extremely diverse. Their costumes, nomenclature,
dances, prayers, rites and even annual ritual calendar often
differ substantially among groups and locations. They have no
church, no codified doctrine, no accepted clergy and no schools
teaching Alevi customs. There is, though, a certain underlying
compatibility." But it is precisely this prospect of unity that
scares the Sunni Muslims. There is a great number of Alevis, and
if they succeed in creating a common doctrine based on the oral
tradition, they constitute a threat against the Sunni Muslim
majority. The Alevilik principle must therefore be nipped in the
bud.
The new Alevism that has emerged with the urbanisation process
creates uncertainty among conservative Sunni Muslims. The
violence in focus here is mainly physical, but the issue at
stake is also power in a more abstract sense. In his German
publications, Elias used the word Gewalt which denotes violence,
assault, power and coercion, but can also be connected with the
state and staatsrechtliche phenomena, as in Gewaltente¬ilung and
Gewaltentrennung. There is an implicit message here, indicating
that the legislative power and the executive (violent) one, as
the judicial one, are separated . Elias often refers to
violation and offence of physical integrity when he uses the
term "violence". The number of people involved in the violent
acts is significant; violence is often connected with group
norms and transgressions, and with 'we-images'. When the
violence pertains to identification with a leading group, or an
established opposition, such as the Alevis, it is political
violence. The we-image can be tied to the nation state and the
feeling of guilt aroused by violence against an ethnic group is
then seen as existing on a national level - as when all Germans
were accused of the Nazi holocaust of Jews.
Elias asks whether an act of violence is carried out as the
result of a rational choice made by the violent person to
realise a plan, that is, whether the violence is instrumental,
or whether the act of violence is emotionally satisfactory as
such, that is, an expressive phenomenon.
I address similar questions in my study of the massacres in
Maraş. According to Elias, the civilization process is dependent
on the control of violence: landowners, who are involved in a
process concerning competition, try to eliminate each other by
violence, in order for the violence then to be controlled by
those in power. However, power is based on relations, and a
mutual dependence between the two groups in Kahramanmaraş
developed, even if the relation involved no shared rules or
norms. An antagonistic relation is a kind of functional
interdependence. When Alevis became neighbours and competitors
of the Sunni Muslims, the spreading of rumours accelerated.
"Collective fantasies have to be understood in the context of
fluctuating power relations...the workings of we-images and
we-ideals stand out most sharply when fantasy and reality fall
apart."
The acts carried out by one group are not understandable unless
we refer to the action of the other group. In conflicting
circumstances there is a dynamic that can lead to violence, and
the mutual dependence reveals a processual structure. When the
established and the outsiders lack common norms and do not use
the same means to reach their religious goals, plans and actions
within both groups are governed by the imaginative descriptions
of the threat constituted by the other group; this also involves
the frightening power resources of "the Others".
Elias calls a situation where two groups are connected by their
suspicion of each other a double bind.
Such circular processes result from a lack of control over
natural or social processes, the dynamics of which are
relatively or completely autonomous from the wishes and
intentions of those involved with them. A lessening or lack of
human control over any set of events will increase the tendency
for people's thinking about such events to involve a higher
emotional and fantasy content; and the more emo¬tional their
thinking becomes, the less able they are to formulate more
realistic or adequate models of these events.
In order to explain the socio-genesis of violence, Elias uses
the concepts of "social habitus" and "national identity". The
traditional habitus of the Alevis, their outer appearance, has
lived on in their social habitus. However, the social
organization that once created the Alevi lifestyle, the customs
that are not shaped by the Turkish nation state (that is,
relations typical of groups living isolated in the mountains),
came to be influenced by the unequal relations of dependence
that developed in the towns after the Alevi settled there. The
changes naturally include conflicts, and these function as an
intermediate stage for the transition from one level of
integration to another. The ethnic group, which by the Sunni
Muslims is called "Mountain Turks" or "Tribal People", was to be
remoulded into supporters of the Turkish nation state through a
civilisation process. But they resisted; the men did not want to
attend Friday prayers at the mosque and the Alevis struggled to
maintain their own customs and habits. Conflicts between the
established and the outsiders emerged at an early stage.
The established and the outsiders
Gossip always has two poles; one consisting of those who gossip
and the other of those who are being gossiped about. When the
subject and the object belong to two different groups, the frame
of reference is not only that of the group gossiping, but also
the situation and structure of both groups, as well as the
relation between the groups. This wider frame of reference is
necessary for us to understand that rumour is an efficient
method which is being used by some to offend and humiliate
members of another group, and to secure their own advantage and
superiority.
The things being said by those doing the gossiping are, to a
large extent, untrue, but those being gossiped about find it
difficult to correct misunderstandings and are seldom able to
openly confront false accusations. Those singled out as shameful
and addressed with derogatory names can seldom return the
accusations and retaliate with the same means as they form an
oppressed minority. The group lacks power. But when exploring
the rumour configuration on a deeper level, personal opinions
can be discerned in parallel with the organisational aspect
(which, for example, reveals that Sunni Muslims hold all key
positions, meaning that the network of the majority is the one
that counts).
The phenomenon of individuals being either blamed or praised
because they belong to a group which is blamed or praised exists
all over the world. Those being harassed cannot retaliate, since
even if they personally are innocent of what they are being
accused of, they do not want to give up their group identity.
Slander and abuse trigger a feeling a guilt and shame in those
who belong to the oppressed social group - partly because of
symbols infusing a feeling of inferiority, partly because they
are ascribed worthlessness - and all this suppresses their
opposition. Thus a feature of the social mechanism is created
that the dominating social group makes use of in order to
maintain their superiority. Individuals cannot escape the
stigmatisation of the group. They are identified with the
character and situation of their own group both externally and
internally. Those originating from the same village tend to
judge themselves on the basis of the image that others hold of
them. The collective disgrace that the powerful majority group
ascribes to the minority is expressed in commonly acknowledged
invectives and stereotypical blaming rumours; this kind of
gossip is rooted in personality structures and the identity of
individuals, as in the collective honour or virtue that the
majority group thinks they embody. A kind of group charisma
exists as the central element of the members' self-image; thy do
not see themselves as individuals, but as belonging to a certain
group, a collective. Therefore they find themselves to be
particularly important.
However, it is only when a sharp line is drawn between one's own
group and the other that the group charisma fufills its uniting
functions; it then becomes group-preserving. When a border has
been defined and the Others have been excluded from
participation, these outsiders will never be able to get any
part of the honour and virtue that the established insider-group
has ascribed to itself. By elevating those included in the
group, the group charisma automatically banishes the
outsider-group to a lower social status, a subordinate position.
The charisma that the established think they possess is
sharp-edged; it not only helps to define the border between
inside and outside, the charisma also functions as a weapon
keeping the outsiders at a distance, which maintains the purity
and integrity of the group. Thus, group charisma can be both a
weapon for self-defence and a tool for attacking. The charisma
implies that it is a sign of dishonour not to be part of the
honour and virtue that the established majority, the eminent
group, allegedly carries.
Everywhere, group charisma ascribed to one's own group, and
disgrace, used to label the other group, are phenomena that
complement each other. By using stereotypical expressions, one
group praises itself and condemns another; even the most
criminal and dangerous among the insiders partake of the
charisma and identify with the characteristics and values that
the majority group as a whole is seen as representing. A
threatening and unpleasant person can think of himself as being
as good when only some in the established group actually are.
The structure of rumour is connected with the gossiping group;
self-praise turns into idealization and blaming rumours
transform into clichéd slander, and these phenomena are closely
related to the perception of the charisma of one's own group and
the dishonour of the other group. The conservative Sunni Muslims
in the Anatolian small towns have grown up with negative views
of the Alevis in the mountain villages. Notions of Alevis
existed together with symbols correspondingly praising the Sunni
group. Abusing and insulting words were always close at hand
when the Others were to be described. A person who, since
childhood, has heard positive and negative descriptions of
groups is deeply affected by this and it is obviously decisive
for the individual's personal image of these groups. The
collective identity, and as a part thereof, the collective pride
and the aspiration for group charisma, shape an individual's
identity and is seen in the perception of both the individual
person and that of other people. Nobody grows up without one's
personal identity rooted in identification with the group, or
with several groups, even if this is only subtly expressed and
perhaps totally forgotten. Most people know the conditions
pertaining to positive gossip about one's own group and to
negative rumours about the other; they have heard praise and
slander, and know something of the superiority as opposed to the
feeling of inferiority connected with these.
Norbert Elias adopted neither Marxist nor Weberian ideals when
he set out to analyse social changes. He thought, for example,
that not everything could be reduced to issues of control over
financial power. Neither did the various concepts of the
Weberians, with three dimensions or factors significant for the
change and distribution of power, fit the thoughts of Elias.
Meaning (significance) and power are in focus. Power is a
polymorphous phenomenon made up of the characteristics that all
relations of mutual dependence possess. Elias tried to find
categories that could be used to eliminate the inequality
displayed in social relations. The theory of the established and
the outsiders, like the theory of the civilisation process,
links changes in the power relations between groups to the
social habitus of the group members. These two theories resemble
each other; the issue of established people and such who are not
allowed to enter the community is not a question of what society
looks like at a certain point in time (in this case,
Kah¬ramanmaraş in December 1978), but how it has developed over
the years. Sunni Muslims who have belonged to the majority since
the Osman Empire are proud of this fact. The established small
town families see themselves as guarding virtue and
respectability; their networks consist of institutions that
channel both mutual help and rumours about the Others. So,
rumour is the powerful instrument for exclusion. The newcomers
were not accepted by the majority; this was noticeable by the
fact the cafés frequented by Alevis became "Alevi haunts" and
the Sunni Muslims stopped going there.
Elias has a similar description of gathering places that are not
good enough for the established once the outsider group has
started frequenting these places. This is an example of the
morality and self-restraint that the insider group uses as a
means of distinguishing themselves from the "inferior", which
refers to the arguments presented by Elias in Über den Prozess
der Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und psychogenetische
Untersuchungen. Erster band: Wandlungen des Verhaltens in den
weltlichen Oberschichten des Abendlandes (1939) , for example
concerning the feeling of that which is "embarrassing". The
self-image of the established includes the view that they are
more moral, that is, have more civilised norms, and that the
intruders threaten their traditions and the common small-town
identity. The outsider group is labelled as uncivilized, and
here rumour plays an important part. "Gossip is highly selective
and distorting. Through it, people compete in demonstrating
their fervent adherence to their own group norms by expressing
their shock and horror at the behaviour of those who do not
conform."
Elias' study shows that the rumours conveyed by those who regard
themselves as superior are quite similar. The story had all the
typical features of a pieceof gossip. The tone of voice and the
choice of words were identical, as was the simplification of
characters and motives, the arrangement of the points of the
story in black and white, and, of course, the underlying norms
and beliefs. In most cases, the entertainment value of gossip
seemed to be linked to ingredients that flattered the
self-esteem of the narrator, the listener or both. This did not
mean that the stories always were an accusation of the Others,
or had an undertone of malevolence. Praise-gossip always
concerned the established group itself.
When key positions in society belong to the majority and the
minority lacks an influential network, it can be the case that
some of those belonging to the group of outsiders feel ashamed
on behalf of other non-established people and their behaviour
which is not accepted by the majority. Once more, it can be
noted how closely tied the structure of gossip is tied to that
of the gossiping group. What has earlier been noted as 'praising
gossip' tending to idealization and "condemning gossip" tending
to stereotypical slander, are phenomena closely connected with
the belief in the charisma of one's own group and the collective
shame of the other group.
An unfavourable collective we-image is incorporate in the
self-image of the individual and develops in parallel with the
favourable image that the established group holds of itself. In
old established groups, where the youth and perhaps their
parents and grandparents since childhood have been fed with such
convictions, with connected symbols of praise and blame,
positive and negative images of this kind permeate the
individual's personality. The collective identity, and within
it, the collective pride and the charismatic claims of the
group, contribute to shaping the identity of the individuals in
both their own eyes and those of around them.
Rounding off in the footsteps of Norbert Elias
Elias uses the concepts of group charisma and group disgrace -
the charisma of the established, powerful group in connected
with the dishonour ascribed to the outsiders and the group
disgrace that the non-accepted have internalized. There are
various examples of the fact that people in general have
experienced both praising and condemning gossip, and the
attitudes of superiority or inferiority connected with these.
According to Elias, the satisfaction that group charisma gives
leads to a kind of compensation for the frustration that is
always caused by the adjustment to the strict norms of the group
(characterising an elevated position). "Higher standards of
'civility' are reflected through our heightened 'thresholds of
repugnance', our 'disgust func¬tions', which led to our moral
criticism of, and indeed physical revulsion towards, breaches of
corporeal taboos."
This is connected with Elias' civilisation process discussions
on the habits of the elite, shame as a mechanism and on the
ambivalent relations between social groups; these are
significant aspects in the long run for the large-scale
development of communities.
Elias' message is that we must not think that differences in
status as based on an agreed ranking of positions in society
which in some way would be incompatible with conflict. Terms
such as 'status hierarchy' and 'order of rank' are sometimes
used as if they referred to normally harmonious figurations that
are only temporarily connected with tension and conflicts. The
fact is that tension and conflicts constitute and inherent
structural element in status hierarchies everywhere.
Elias' theory on the established and the outsider has often been
overshadowed by the theory on the civilisation process, but the
one is actually a continuation of the other. Both deal with the
connection between the development of power relations and
structures of character; the focus is on the mutual dependence
between the individual and the collective.
Sunni Muslims and Alevis are mutually dependent on each other.
But since the Sunnis monopolise all important posts in the small
towns of southern Anatolia, the power balance is very unequal.
The notions of group charisma and group disgrace are at work in
a very obvious way. A stigmatisation process dominates society
and several Alevis have tried/are trying to expressly take on
the norms of the established group, while others who have chosen
to be Alevis in their particular way, quite unconsciously absorb
the view that the established group holds of them, so that the
we-image is affected and occasionally creates resignation,
despite resistance to it. Thus, the tension between the groups
is constantly being heightened. In circumstances when the Alevis
have been able to financially compete with the Sunnis, the power
balance has been less unequal; at these times, rebellions have
arisen, opposition has been clearly expressed and attempts at
emancipation have taken place. The historical chain of events
and the position of the Sunnis in the Osman Empire are
essential; their oppression of Alevis has influenced and shaped
this outsider group. The way in which both groups have been
dependent on each other has made them strive towards certain
goals and formulate claims or demands on a certain lifestyle.
Since the Sunnis have been in the majority, the unequal power
balance has caused a distorted view of reality. The image of
'the Others' is twisted and imaginary; and in the same way, the
self-image is also warped.
By illuminating collective fantasies that are expressed in
rumour, the theory of the established and the outsiders
complements Elias' theory on the civilisation process. The
collective imagination is a strange phenomenon. Power relations
are characterised by collective praise and defamation, and many
figments of the imagination have developed over a long period of
time. The issues observed and explained must be seen as parts of
processes, and therefore tradition plays an important role in
creating power relations.
The fact that differences between the features of "old" and
"new" are still perceived as relevant for structural differences
between groups is largely due to the fact that the dominant
notion of "social structure" makes people see structures as
"still pictures", as "structures in a stable state", while the
movement of structures in time, in the form of development or
other kinds of social change, are treated as "historical", which
in the language of sociology often means that they are looked
upon as separate from the structure, and not as an inseparable
part of it.
The massacre in the town of Karamanmaraş in 1978 was the
culmination of a long process. The abounding rumours had built
up during a long period of time, and the moral panic that broke
out in December can partly be interpreted by using Elias' theory
on the established and the outsiders. "Rumors crystallize the
perceptions that members of each group have of the group toward
which they feel hostile." The Sunni, and right-wing extremist,
attack on the Alevis cannot be explained by gossip only, but
rumours and orgies of violence are connected. Rumours often
trigger riots; at least they aggravate the situation and pave
the way for violence in combination with other factors.
Literature and sources
Alvesson, Mats and Deetz, Stanley, Kritisk samhällsvetenskaplig
metod, Lund: Student¬litteratur, 2000.
Anderson, Benedict, Imaginary Communities: Reflections on the
Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso, 1983.
Andrews, Peter A., Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey,
Wiesbaden: L. Reichert, 1989.
Ataseven, İlhan, The Alevi-Bektaşi Legacy: Problems of
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